

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Counselor and Chairman  
Policy Planning Council  
Washington

~~TOP SECRET~~

October 24, 1962

TO: Mr. McGeorge Bundy  
FROM: W. W. Rostow  
SUBJECT: Report Number One of Planning Subcommittee.

1. As of this morning the planning exercise is inaugurated.

2. We suggest that the following decisions by the Executive Committee of the NSC may be urgent:

a. Press and diplomatic guidance on turning back of certain Soviet ships. It seems essential that no one throw his hat in the air at this point. It may be merely buying time to set up a more serious military confrontation; and, in any case, it leaves open the question of the capabilities still on the island.

b. The issue of taking out the missiles and installations already in Cuba increases in urgency. The Soviets may try to deflate the present crisis quickly and settle for what is in the island and what they can subsequently deliver by clandestine means. If we are going to act, we should consider acting very soon. Harry Rowen is in charge of work at the Pentagon on alternative methods. The Executive Committee may wish to review those alternative methods today.

c. If the ships do turn back, a prompt, quiet approach to Castro may be an urgent appropriate next step.

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Stamps 3/3/75 Nuk-75-102  
MFD 4/10/75

3. The following subjects are now the subject of planning:

a. The shape of a political settlement under the leadership of Henry Owen. He will be in touch with the bureaus and the Disarmament people.

b. Rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea: DOD and JCS.

c. Increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations: DOD and JCS.

d. Clarification of doctrinal basis for our position: W. Jorden, working with P, L, and USIA.

4. In accordance with the President's instruction, Henry Owen, Mose Harvey, and I have begun work urgently on contingency track for a Summit meeting.

5. A general, interim appreciation of possible Soviet intentions will come forward this afternoon.

**DRAFT FOLLOWS**

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DECLASSIFICATION DATE 6/10/71

PER H. Kissinger - 6/10/71 : E-100  
FADRE FOI CASE NO. 620289 Bernard

October 24, 1962

DEPARTMENT OF STATE A/CDC/ADM

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TO: The Secretary  
Under Secretary  
G - Mr. Johnson

REVIEWED by JW

DATE 5/19/88

( RELEASE)  DECLASSIFY

( EXCISE)  DECLASSIFY in PART

( DENY)  Non-responsive info.

FOI, EO or PA exemptions

TS authority to:

FROM: S/P - Walt W. Rostow ( CLASSIFY as \_\_\_\_\_, OADR  
( DOWNGRADE TS to ( S or ( C, OADR

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(b) The issue of taking out the missiles and installations already in Cuba increases in urgency. The Soviets may try to deflate the present crisis quickly and settle for what is in the island and what they can subsequently deliver by clandestine means. If we are going to act, we should consider acting very soon. Harry Rowen is in charge of work at the Pentagon on alternative methods. The Executive Committee may wish to review those alternative methods today.

(c) If the ships do turn back, a prompt, quiet approach to Cuba may be an urgent appropriate next step.

3. The following subjects are now the subject of planning:

(a) The shape of a political settlement (strictly within the State Department) under the leadership of Henry Owen. He will be in touch with the bureaus and the Disarmament people.

(b) Rules of engagement for a protracted war at sea: DOD and JCS.

(c) Increased

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(c) Increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative  
means for taking out missiles and installations: DOD and  
JCS.

(d) Clarification of doctrinal basis for our position: w. Jordan,  
working with P, L, and USIA.

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(c) Increased pressure on Cuba, including alternative means for taking out missiles and installations. DOD and JCS.

(d) Clarification of doctrinal basis for our position: w. Jordan, working with P. L, and USIA.